ABSTRACT
Not long ago, developing and emerging economies were known as "Third World" nations mired in poverty, debt crises, stratospheric inflation rates, and chronic instability while advanced countries seemed to hold the keys to prosperity. Tables have turned. The first decade of the 21 st century brought unprecedented economic progress in the developing world, which now produces half of global GDP and is expected to account for almost three quarters of global growth by 2017 . It has been a less auspicious time for developed countries, evidenced by the epic Financial Crisis of 2008-09 and its consequences for the United States and Europe.
As the fortunes of nations ebb and flow, it is important to distinguish between cycles and trends. Recent statistics suggesting an upswing in advanced countries and decreased growth in emerging markets divert our attention from the most important story about the world economy since the end of the Second World War, even as it continues to unfold. Namely, that through their struggle to reject failed models of development such as dependency theory and central planning-often at the behest of advanced-nation governments in the past-a critical mass of developing countries turned themselves around by embracing the true key to success: a disciplined approach to economic policy. 1 Discipline is a sustained commitment to a pragmatic growth strategy executed with a combination of temperance, vigilance, and flexibility that values the long-term prosperity of all over the short-term enrichment of any single group (Henry, 2013) . Figure 1 , which we constructed using data from the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook (WEO) database and which plots the average growth rate of real GDP in advanced as well as emerging and developing economies from 1980 through 2012, tells the central story that the rest of this 3 article develops in some detail. In addition to the well-documented contraction of advanced economies during the Great Recession of 2008-09, the figure presents two salient facts. 1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 The relatively flat line for growth in advanced economies also suggests that the accelerated rise of living standards in developing countries was not caused by an aggregate shock to the global economy, but points to the idiosyncratic set of reforms (e.g., inflation stabilization and trade liberalization) that were adopted during the 1990s as an unprecedented number of countries rejected ideological approaches to economic policymaking and instead embraced discipline. The pages ahead provide specific illustrations of discipline, seen through the lens of economic reform in the developing world-a story of turnaround in three acts, each of which offers practical lessons for welfare-improving outcomes.
I. The Trade Trap: Discipline Avoids Mercantilism
The recent slow growth in advanced nations has lured their governments into the mercantilist trap of thinking that exports are good, imports are bad, and a large trade surplus is the key to renewed prosperity. Measured by the number of protectionist measures imposed since November 2008, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are all on the list of the world's top 10 most protectionist countries (Evenett, 2013) . The opening act of economic reform in the developing world-South Korea's rise from impoverished nation in the 1950s to manufacturing juggernaut-predates the WEO's time series on global growth, but it demonstrates that discipline in the context of free trade lies not in running surpluses but in driving up productivity through a sustained process of easing restrictions on both imports and exports.
In the 1950s, the Cold War occupied center stage, and countries like Singapore and South Korea were far from the economic "tigers" they would become. In keeping with dependency theory, the dominant intellectual paradigm in the developing world at the time, both countries eschewed trade with developed nations in order to pursue a policy of industrialization through import substitution, but the strategy was not successful in either country. As of 1960, South
Korea's GDP per capita was US$1,100. Evaluating South Korea's prospects for the future at the time, the U.S. Congress argued there was "little or no hope for sustained growth," while World
Bank studies claimed "industrial growth in Korea was not feasible." transportation equipment were vital for production and therefore the country's economic development. Accordingly, they created a minimal "positive" list of permissible investment goods that they allowed to expand over time. By 1967, the commitment to opening up had grown to the point where policymakers replaced the previous list with a "negative" one-a new protocol under which importers were automatically granted permission for any item not enumerated.
Korea's import liberalization strategy had at least two positive effects on the economy.
First, it reduced the cost of production by providing workers and firms with critical inputs at lower prices. Second, it enabled Korean companies to reverse-engineer everything from 
II. Fiscal Follies: Discipline Does Not Equal Austerity
From international trade to public finance, the appropriate role of government in economic activity remains a controversial topic. The Great Recession triggered a contentious debate over whether fiscal consolidation (austerity) is helpful or harmful in restoring developed economies to full employment and sustainable debt trajectories. These debates intensified during the U.S. sequestration standoff and deliberations over the European Fiscal Compact.
Economic commentators from both ends of the political spectrum mistakenly conflate discipline with the false courage to implement extreme policies. When it comes to whether to impose fiscal austerity, however, studying the historical (and objective) responses of developingcountry stock markets to implementation of austerity programs demonstrates the error of unyielding views. Thirty years of data from emerging markets suggest that the disciplined course of action depends largely on the prevailing level of inflation in the country at the time austerity is being considered.
The stock market is a useful tool for determining what discipline means in the context of fiscal policy, because it internalizes both the short-and long-run effects of austerity (Henry, 2002) . To the extent that austerity creates expectations of slower growth and higher discount rates in the short run, it will depress present values. But the potential of higher growth and lower discount rates in the long run creates an offsetting effect. If the expected long-run benefits outweigh the short-run costs, then the country's stock market will rise when its government 8 announces an austerity program. If the expected costs outweigh the benefits, the market will fall.
If the anticipated net effect is zero, there should be little to no market reaction.
The response of the Brazilian stock market to President Henrique Cardoso's plan to end hyperinflation in 1994 illustrates this kind of cost-benefit analysis at work. The Cardoso government instituted fiscal consolidation, unveiled a new currency (the Real) and stopped printing money to pay its bills. In the anticipation of the Real Plan, the Brazilian stock market In line with these negative market forecasts, real GDP also fell sharply and did not return to its pre-recession level until 1986.
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The differing reaction of the stock market to austerity programs conditional on the level of inflation is not a phenomenon exclusive to Brazil and Chile. With inflation rates in the United States and the Euro Area below 2 percent in 2010, Figure 2 suggests that, rather than changing swiftly from stimulus to austerity that year, a more gradual approach to fiscal consolidation for those countries might have been optimal. Indeed, Europe's prolonged decline in economic activity in the aftermath of the Great Recession stands in contrast to the rapid recovery experienced by East Asia following its own crisis in 1997 (caused by similar factors such as property booms and excess leverage). At least part of the difference in the post-crisis paths of employment and output in the two episodes appears to be a result of greater fiscal flexibility on the part of Asian policymakers than their European counterparts (Chari and Henry, 2014) .
A gradual approach to deficit reduction need not imply a lack of seriousness-altering the speed of progress toward a specified fiscal target is not the same as abandoning it. On the contrary, gradualism can be a powerful tool in helping achieve the objectives of a broader growth strategy (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995) . The goal is not to balance the budget in one fell swoop, but to implement positive net present value measures that place government debt on a sustainable trajectory.
III. Discipline Applies to Borrowers and Lenders
When public debt does hit crisis-inducing levels, historical data on stock-market responses in emerging markets also provide important insights about the most efficient way to address the debt overhang and insolvency that inhibit the recovery of European countries such as Debt relief, however, also carries a price tag. It was given to Brady countries in exchange for their agreement to implement growth-enhancing reforms: inflation stabilization, trade liberalization, and privatization of badly run state-owned firms whose lack of profitability was a drag on public finances and helped give rise to debt overhang in the first place. Countries that instituted and sustained subsets of the reforms that were most relevant to their circumstances experienced significant improvements in economic performance. Countries that failed to honor their reform commitments (Jordan, Nigeria, and the Philippines) experienced a much smaller initial rise in the value of their stock markets than other Brady countries-30 percent versus 60 percent-and even those increases completely evaporated within a year as lack of commitment to reforms became obvious (Arslanalp and Henry, 2005) .
The lesson seems clear. Reducing the debt burden can be an important part of a pragmatic growth strategy for countries that suffer from debt overhang. But debt relief will only succeed when implemented in concert with reforms that raise productivity and provide a business environment in which firms have an incentive to generate output, invest in capital, and hire additional workers. Resistance to writing down debts that cannot be repaid places Europe at risk for the extended malaise that has plagued Japan for two decades and stood in the way of Third World resurgence until Secretary Brady's bold change of course.
IV. Conclusion
As advanced and emerging nations struggle to regain their footing in the aftermath of the Great Recession, they face somewhat different challenges. Developed nations seek to return their economies to pre-crisis levels of growth and employment while responsibly addressing income inequality. Developing countries must consolidate their hard-won gains of the past several decades and implement second-stage reforms required in key areas (e.g., infrastructure and labor markets) to maintain their high rates of catch-up growth. The historical examples presented in this article provide wisdom that applies with equal relevance to the varied tasks ahead. The analytical insight at the heart of each narrative is unique, but all three stories of economic transformation contain a common truth: discipline drives turnarounds. If both advanced and developing nations internalize the lesson and embrace a disciplined approach to economic policy, they can grow in concert and create greater prosperity for all.
